Microsoft exchange server, elevation of privilege: 12 records, one defect family
Microsoft exchange server has been reported 12 separate times for the same kind of mistake, Elevation of Privilege, between 2018-11-14 and 2022-11-09. A defect family is our own grouping of the CVE corpus: every record naming one product and one weakness class, collected so a repeat is visible as a repeat. No public source publishes this, and what this page counts is how often this one product has gone wrong in this one way.
What this page is, and what it is not
The records are public. This grouping is not, and this one took more than a lookup. Every record here carries Elevation of Privilege, which matches exactly. The product name does not: the authorities wrote it 4 different ways, and no text match joins those strings, so a search for any one spelling finds a fraction of what exists and gives no sign the rest is there. Our own embedding, pro@dim2000, read those 4 groups, of 5, 3, 2, 2 records, and found they name one product. That is how 12 records no public source connects came to be on one page, and it is the part you cannot look up. Every spelling stays printed beside its own records, because a judgement you cannot inspect is a judgement you should not cite, and if one of them is a different product this family is wrong and its count is wrong with it.
One record is an incident. 12 filings, between 2018-11-14 and 2022-11-09, all landing on the same weakness class in the same product, is a habit in what gets reported here, and a habit is something you can plan around. This is what we held on 2026-09-20.
A repeat is evidence about where to look. If you are reviewing Microsoft exchange server, the records below say which mistake has already been found more than once, which is the cheapest place a reviewer can start. If you are asking the vendor a question, a count under one weakness class is a better question than any single record is.
What this page cannot tell you is decided by what was joined. A product name and a weakness class settled membership, so those two values are the whole of what the page asserts. Records here may sit in the same line of code or in unrelated parts of the product, and we hold no value that separates those cases. A fixed version named in one record closes that record and says nothing about the others. And nothing here describes anyone's systems, because no value in this family connects a product name to an installation.
The names the authorities used
4 different ways, each written by whoever filed the records under it. They are printed as written rather than tidied, because the tidying is the step that would hide what was merged.
Family membership: computed, pro@dim2000
What pulled them together
These records reached one family from 4 separate groups. A join on the product name alone could not see they were the same, because the authorities wrote the product and its versions differently each time. The grouping was computed by pro@dim2000.
What the records offer
8 of 12 records publish a fixed version. For the other 4, held sources name none.
3 records are listed by CISA with a required action, which carries a federal remediation deadline on its own page.
The earliest was published 2018-11-14 and the latest 2022-11-09. That span is how long this product kept producing this weakness, not how long any one record took to fix.
What this family was researched, not held
Exchange privilege escalation is the rung that makes a chain work
Exchange elevation of privilege records here rarely stand alone. CVE-2018-8581 let any user register a push notification callback on Exchange Web Services, so the server would authenticate to an attacker's address, and Exchange holds directory write permissions that make those credentials worth relaying. CVE-2021-34523 let the Exchange PowerShell backend rebuild a user identity from a query string parameter when no authentication header was present, which is the impersonation step in the chain researchers named ProxyShell, demonstrated at Pwn2Own in 2021 and given a CVE months after the update shipped. CVE-2022-41080 was chained with a remote code execution record to reach PowerShell through Outlook Web Access, and Rapid7 reported that the route worked against servers running Microsoft's URL rewrite mitigations but not the November 2022 update. What changes across the span is the front door, not the pattern: the privilege step keeps being available behind whatever entry point is current.
Treat an Exchange elevation of privilege record as chain material rather than a secondary finding, because in each exploited case here it was the step that turned access into control. The 2022 record also shows the practical gap between a vendor mitigation and a vendor update, and the update is what held.
This grouping says these records read alike. It does not say they are one vulnerability, that they touch one set of servers, or that applying any one update addresses any other.
Written from thezdi.com, rapid7.com, isc.sans.edu, cisa.gov. Stated at high confidence. Nothing in this box is a value the index holds, and none of it opens a receipt.
What this page does not cover
This is a family of records that read alike. It is not a shared vulnerability, not an inventory, and not a statement that one fix closes the rest. Each record's own state, its own dates and its own receipts are on its own page.
Grouped by shared product and weakness, not by shared vulnerability. Each record's own state is on its own page.
Everything this vendor has, including records outside this family:
12 records, read from the index as it stood on 20 Sep 2026. Every row opens the record it names, and every value on that record opens its own receipt.