Vmware vcenter server, out-of-bounds write: 6 records, one defect family
Vmware vcenter server has been reported 6 separate times for the same kind of mistake, CWE-787, between 2023-06-22 and 2024-06-18. A defect family is our own grouping of the CVE corpus: every record naming one product and one weakness class, collected so a repeat is visible as a repeat. No public source publishes this, and what this page counts is how often this one product has gone wrong in this one way.
What this page is, and what it is not
The records are public. This grouping is not, and this one took more than a lookup. Every record here carries CWE-787, which matches exactly. The product name does not: the authorities wrote it 2 different ways, and no text match joins those strings, so a search for any one spelling finds a fraction of what exists and gives no sign the rest is there. Our own embedding, pro@dim2000, read those 2 groups, of 3, 3 records, and found they name one product. That is how 6 records no public source connects came to be on one page, and it is the part you cannot look up. Every spelling stays printed beside its own records, because a judgement you cannot inspect is a judgement you should not cite, and if one of them is a different product this family is wrong and its count is wrong with it.
One record is an incident. 6 filings, between 2023-06-22 and 2024-06-18, all landing on the same weakness class in the same product, is a habit in what gets reported here, and a habit is something you can plan around. This is what we held on 2026-09-20.
A repeat is evidence about where to look. If you are reviewing Vmware vcenter server, the records below say which mistake has already been found more than once, which is the cheapest place a reviewer can start. If you are asking the vendor a question, a count under one weakness class is a better question than any single record is.
What this page cannot tell you is decided by what was joined. A product name and a weakness class settled membership, so those two values are the whole of what the page asserts. Records here may sit in the same line of code or in unrelated parts of the product, and we hold no value that separates those cases. A fixed version named in one record closes that record and says nothing about the others. And nothing here describes anyone's systems, because no value in this family connects a product name to an installation.
The names the authorities used
2 different ways, each written by whoever filed the records under it. They are printed as written rather than tidied, because the tidying is the step that would hide what was merged.
Family membership: computed, pro@dim2000
What pulled them together
These records reached one family from 2 separate groups. A join on the product name alone could not see they were the same, because the authorities wrote the product and its versions differently each time. The grouping was computed by pro@dim2000.
What the records offer
All 6 records publish a fixed version.
2 records are listed by CISA with a required action, which carries a federal remediation deadline on its own page.
The earliest was published 2023-06-22 and the latest 2024-06-18. That span is how long this product kept producing this weakness, not how long any one record took to fix.
What this family was researched, not held
vCenter's DCERPC code produced memory corruption year after year
Every record here names the same subsystem, the DCERPC protocol implementation inside vCenter Server. VMware listed five of them at once in advisory VMSA-2023-0014 on 22 June 2023, credited to Aleksandar Nikolic and Dimitrios Tatsis of Cisco Talos, covering a heap overflow from uninitialised memory, a use after free, an out of bounds write, a memory corruption and an out of bounds read. CVE-2023-34048 followed on 25 October 2023, and Mandiant later matched vmdird service crashes seen across UNC3886 cases between late 2021 and early 2022 to it, so it was in use before the fix existed; CISA added it on 22 January 2024 with a 12 February date. Advisory VMSA-2024-0012 on 18 June 2024 added two more heap overflows in the same protocol code, credited to Hao Zheng and Zibo Li of the TianGong Team, and the Zero Day Initiative placed CVE-2024-37079 in libdcerpc.so, the library shared by the certificate, directory and authentication services. Broadcom revised that advisory on 23 January 2026 to say exploitation of CVE-2024-37079 had occurred in the wild, and CISA added it the same day.
A run of findings in one protocol implementation usually means that code is being examined hard, not that any single one of them is still open. If you run vCenter, confirm your build against each record on its own, because this group crosses several advisories and several fixed versions.
This note establishes only that these records read alike: one product, one subsystem named in the text, one weakness class. It does not say they share a vulnerability or an estate, and patching any one of them says nothing about the others.
Written from support.broadcom.com, support.broadcom.com, cveawg.mitre.org, cisa.gov, cisa.gov, thezdi.com, bleepingcomputer.com. Stated at high confidence. Nothing in this box is a value the index holds, and none of it opens a receipt.
What this page does not cover
This is a family of records that read alike. It is not a shared vulnerability, not an inventory, and not a statement that one fix closes the rest. Each record's own state, its own dates and its own receipts are on its own page.
Grouped by shared product and weakness, not by shared vulnerability. Each record's own state is on its own page.
Everything this vendor has, including records outside this family:
6 records, read from the index as it stood on 20 Sep 2026. Every row opens the record it names, and every value on that record opens its own receipt.