Netscaler adc, improper restriction of operations within the bounds of a memory buffer: 5 records, one defect family
Netscaler adc has been reported 5 separate times for the same kind of mistake, CWE-119, between 2025-06-25 and 2026-06-30. A defect family is our own grouping of the CVE corpus: every record naming one product and one weakness class, collected so a repeat is visible as a repeat. No public source publishes this, and what this page counts is how often this one product has gone wrong in this one way.
What this page is, and what it is not
The records are public. This grouping is not. No source publishes defect families, so we built them: every record in the corpus sorted by the product an authority named and the weakness class carried with it, 21316 families over 105586 records. This one holds every record that names Netscaler adc and carries CWE-119, matched character for character. We show the join because a grouping you cannot check is a grouping you should not cite.
That is 5 filings, between 2025-06-25 and 2026-06-30, landing on the same weakness class in the same product. At this count it is a repeat rather than a pattern, and the roster below is short enough to read in full. This is what we held on 2026-09-20.
A repeat is evidence about where to look. If you are reviewing Netscaler adc, the records below say which mistake has already been found more than once, which is the cheapest place a reviewer can start. If you are asking the vendor a question, a count under one weakness class is a better question than any single record is.
What this page cannot tell you is decided by what was joined. A product name and a weakness class settled membership, so those two values are the whole of what the page asserts. Records here may sit in the same line of code or in unrelated parts of the product, and we hold no value that separates those cases. A fixed version named in one record closes that record and says nothing about the others. And nothing here describes anyone's systems, because no value in this family connects a product name to an installation.
The names the authorities used
One spelling, used by every authority that filed one of these records: netscaler adc.
Family membership: held values. Joined on the product and weakness class the assigning authorities wrote, with no model involved.
What the records offer
All 5 records publish a fixed version.
3 records are listed by CISA with a required action, which carries a federal remediation deadline on its own page.
The earliest was published 2025-06-25 and the latest 2026-06-30. That span is how long this product kept producing this weakness, not how long any one record took to fix.
What this family was researched, not held
NetScaler memory overflows keep landing in the gateway paths
Every record here is a memory overflow in NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway, and most reach the appliance only in gateway or AAA virtual server configurations. In June 2025 the vendor described CVE-2025-6543 as a memory overflow leading to unintended control flow and denial of service, scored it 9.2, and said exploitation had been observed. Its August 2025 bulletin repeated the class for CVE-2025-7775 and CVE-2025-7776, citing improper restriction of operations within the bounds of a memory buffer, and said exploits on unmitigated appliances had been observed. In August 2026 researchers at watchTowr published an analysis of CVE-2026-8452, which the vendor bulletin had called a memory overflow, and reported a heap overflow in the appliance's SAML signature canonicalisation where an oversized PrefixList value is copied into a fixed size buffer without a length check, giving code execution as root without authentication.
The described impact of one of these records changed after publication, so a decision taken from a first reading can go stale without the record changing identity. The configuration preconditions in each advisory, gateway, AAA, PCoIP profile, Oracle load balancing, DNS proxy, are what decide whether a given record reaches your appliance at all.
This note does not claim these records share a vulnerability, an appliance, or a fix, and no build that closes one of them is evidence about another. They are grouped because they read alike: one product line and one weakness class.
Written from support.citrix.com, netscaler.com, labs.watchtowr.com, cisa.gov. Stated at high confidence. Nothing in this box is a value the index holds, and none of it opens a receipt.
What this page does not cover
This is a family of records that read alike. It is not a shared vulnerability, not an inventory, and not a statement that one fix closes the rest. Each record's own state, its own dates and its own receipts are on its own page.
Grouped by shared product and weakness, not by shared vulnerability. Each record's own state is on its own page.
5 records, read from the index as it stood on 20 Sep 2026. Every row opens the record it names, and every value on that record opens its own receipt.