Juniper networks junos os, missing authentication for critical function: 5 records, one defect family
Juniper networks junos os has been reported 5 separate times for the same kind of mistake, CWE-306, between 2023-08-17 and 2026-04-08. A defect family is our own grouping of the CVE corpus: every record naming one product and one weakness class, collected so a repeat is visible as a repeat. No public source publishes this, and what this page counts is how often this one product has gone wrong in this one way.
What this page is, and what it is not
The records are public. This grouping is not. No source publishes defect families, so we built them: every record in the corpus sorted by the product an authority named and the weakness class carried with it, 21316 families over 105586 records. This one holds every record that names Juniper networks junos os and carries CWE-306, matched character for character. We show the join because a grouping you cannot check is a grouping you should not cite.
That is 5 filings, between 2023-08-17 and 2026-04-08, landing on the same weakness class in the same product. At this count it is a repeat rather than a pattern, and the roster below is short enough to read in full. This is what we held on 2026-09-20.
A repeat is evidence about where to look. If you are reviewing Juniper networks junos os, the records below say which mistake has already been found more than once, which is the cheapest place a reviewer can start. If you are asking the vendor a question, a count under one weakness class is a better question than any single record is.
What this page cannot tell you is decided by what was joined. A product name and a weakness class settled membership, so those two values are the whole of what the page asserts. Records here may sit in the same line of code or in unrelated parts of the product, and we hold no value that separates those cases. A fixed version named in one record closes that record and says nothing about the others. And nothing here describes anyone's systems, because no value in this family connects a product name to an installation.
The names the authorities used
One spelling, used by every authority that filed one of these records: juniper networks junos os.
Family membership: held values. Joined on the product and weakness class the assigning authorities wrote, with no model involved.
What the records offer
All 5 records publish a fixed version.
3 records are listed by CISA with a required action, which carries a federal remediation deadline on its own page.
The earliest was published 2023-08-17 and the latest 2026-04-08. That span is how long this product kept producing this weakness, not how long any one record took to fix.
What this family was researched, not held
J-Web accepted uploads from callers it never identified
Juniper published an out of cycle bulletin on 17 August 2023 covering four J-Web flaws on SRX and EX Series devices, and said they could be combined to allow pre-authentication remote code execution. Three of the records here are the missing authentication half of that chain: a request to a PHP endpoint uploaded a file without the device ever asking who was calling. Operators who could not patch were told to disable J-Web or restrict access to trusted hosts, and CISA repeated the advice to apply the updates. Shadowserver observed exploit attempts from 25 August 2023, and on 13 November 2023 CISA added five of the Junos OS J-Web records to its known exploited catalog. The class did not stay inside the web interface: a record published in April 2024 describes IPsec tunnels configured with hmac-sha-384 or hmac-sha-512 sending no authentication information at all, while the configuration and the operational commands report that authentication is being performed.
The common thread is a function that acted on a request without establishing who sent it, so the useful question is what is reachable, not only what is patched. Where J-Web is exposed to an untrusted network, the vendor's own fallback was to turn it off or fence it to trusted hosts.
This grouping says these records read alike. It does not say they share a vulnerability, a code path or an estate, and the later records sit in different subsystems, so patching one of them does not address another.
Written from rapid7.com, cisa.gov, cisa.gov, incibe.es. Stated at high confidence. Nothing in this box is a value the index holds, and none of it opens a receipt.
What this page does not cover
This is a family of records that read alike. It is not a shared vulnerability, not an inventory, and not a statement that one fix closes the rest. Each record's own state, its own dates and its own receipts are on its own page.
Grouped by shared product and weakness, not by shared vulnerability. Each record's own state is on its own page.
Everything this vendor has, including records outside this family:
5 records, read from the index as it stood on 20 Sep 2026. Every row opens the record it names, and every value on that record opens its own receipt.