Ivanti endpoint manager mobile, code injection: 3 records, one defect family
Ivanti endpoint manager mobile has been reported 3 separate times for the same kind of mistake, CWE-94, between 2025-05-13 and 2026-01-29. A defect family is our own grouping of the CVE corpus: every record naming one product and one weakness class, collected so a repeat is visible as a repeat. No public source publishes this, and what this page counts is how often this one product has gone wrong in this one way.
What this page is, and what it is not
The records are public. This grouping is not. No source publishes defect families, so we built them: every record in the corpus sorted by the product an authority named and the weakness class carried with it, 21316 families over 105586 records. This one holds every record that names Ivanti endpoint manager mobile and carries CWE-94, matched character for character. We show the join because a grouping you cannot check is a grouping you should not cite.
That is 3 filings, between 2025-05-13 and 2026-01-29, landing on the same weakness class in the same product. At this count it is a repeat rather than a pattern, and the roster below is short enough to read in full. This is what we held on 2026-09-20.
A repeat is evidence about where to look. If you are reviewing Ivanti endpoint manager mobile, the records below say which mistake has already been found more than once, which is the cheapest place a reviewer can start. If you are asking the vendor a question, a count under one weakness class is a better question than any single record is.
What this page cannot tell you is decided by what was joined. A product name and a weakness class settled membership, so those two values are the whole of what the page asserts. Records here may sit in the same line of code or in unrelated parts of the product, and we hold no value that separates those cases. A fixed version named in one record closes that record and says nothing about the others. And nothing here describes anyone's systems, because no value in this family connects a product name to an installation.
The names the authorities used
One spelling, used by every authority that filed one of these records: ivanti endpoint manager mobile.
Family membership: held values. Joined on the product and weakness class the assigning authorities wrote, with no model involved.
What the records offer
All 3 records publish a fixed version.
3 records are listed by CISA with a required action, which carries a federal remediation deadline on its own page.
The earliest was published 2025-05-13 and the latest 2026-01-29. That span is how long this product kept producing this weakness, not how long any one record took to fix.
What this family was researched, not held
EPMM keeps running request input before the session exists
Each record is code injection in Ivanti Endpoint Manager Mobile reached over plain HTTP. In 2025, CVE-2025-4428 was expression language injection in the validator behind the featureusage endpoint, where attacker text reached Spring's message formatting and was evaluated, and researchers at watchTowr showed the validator ran before authentication completed, which is the separate record CVE-2025-4427. Ivanti attributed that pair to two open source libraries integrated into the product, and the researchers questioned whether the fault lay in the libraries or in how the product called them. In January 2026 two more records landed, CVE-2026-1281 and CVE-2026-1340, injecting Bash commands through GET requests to the in-house application distribution and Android file transfer endpoints with no authentication required. Ivanti said exploitation had occurred before disclosure, and CISA set a three day remediation deadline on the first of the two.
Both times, the way in was a handler that acted on request data before a session was established, so the exposure question for this product is which endpoints answer an unauthenticated caller. A public proof of concept followed the January 2026 advisory within a day, which is the window you have.
This note does not say these records share a vulnerability, an appliance, or a fix, and nothing here implies that patching one addresses another. They are grouped because they read alike, one product and one weakness class.
Written from labs.watchtowr.com, tenable.com, rapid7.com, cisa.gov. Stated at high confidence. Nothing in this box is a value the index holds, and none of it opens a receipt.
What this page does not cover
This is a family of records that read alike. It is not a shared vulnerability, not an inventory, and not a statement that one fix closes the rest. Each record's own state, its own dates and its own receipts are on its own page.
Grouped by shared product and weakness, not by shared vulnerability. Each record's own state is on its own page.
Everything this vendor has, including records outside this family:
3 records, read from the index as it stood on 20 Sep 2026. Every row opens the record it names, and every value on that record opens its own receipt.