Microsoft corporation windows, elevation of privilege: 24 records, one defect family
Microsoft corporation windows has been reported 24 separate times for the same kind of mistake, Elevation of Privilege, between 2017-03-17 and 2018-04-02. A defect family is our own grouping of the CVE corpus: every record naming one product and one weakness class, collected so a repeat is visible as a repeat. No public source publishes this, and what this page counts is how often this one product has gone wrong in this one way.
What this page is, and what it is not
The records are public. This grouping is not, and this one took more than a lookup. Every record here carries Elevation of Privilege, which matches exactly. The product name does not: the authorities wrote it 5 different ways, and no text match joins those strings, so a search for any one spelling finds a fraction of what exists and gives no sign the rest is there. Our own embedding, pro@dim2000, read those 5 groups, of 10, 5, 3, 3, 3 records, and found they name one product. That is how 24 records no public source connects came to be on one page, and it is the part you cannot look up. Every spelling stays printed beside its own records, because a judgement you cannot inspect is a judgement you should not cite, and if one of them is a different product this family is wrong and its count is wrong with it.
One record is an incident. 24 filings, between 2017-03-17 and 2018-04-02, all landing on the same weakness class in the same product, is a habit in what gets reported here, and a habit is something you can plan around. This is what we held on 2026-09-20.
A repeat is evidence about where to look. If you are reviewing Microsoft corporation windows, the records below say which mistake has already been found more than once, which is the cheapest place a reviewer can start. If you are asking the vendor a question, a count under one weakness class is a better question than any single record is.
What this page cannot tell you is decided by what was joined. A product name and a weakness class settled membership, so those two values are the whole of what the page asserts. Records here may sit in the same line of code or in unrelated parts of the product, and we hold no value that separates those cases. A fixed version named in one record closes that record and says nothing about the others. And nothing here describes anyone's systems, because no value in this family connects a product name to an installation.
The names the authorities used
5 different ways, each written by whoever filed the records under it. They are printed as written rather than tidied, because the tidying is the step that would hide what was merged.
Family membership: computed, pro@dim2000
What pulled them together
These records reached one family from 5 separate groups. A join on the product name alone could not see they were the same, because the authorities wrote the product and its versions differently each time. The grouping was computed by pro@dim2000.
What the records offer
No record in this family publishes a fixed version in held sources.
3 records are listed by CISA with a required action, which carries a federal remediation deadline on its own page.
The earliest was published 2017-03-17 and the latest 2018-04-02. That span is how long this product kept producing this weakness, not how long any one record took to fix.
What this family was researched, not held
Windows graphics and COM privilege bugs, patched in batches
Windows graphics code is where this pattern keeps landing. Microsoft's bulletin MS17-013, published on 14 March 2017, carried four separate records all titled Windows GDI Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability, and marked one of them, CVE-2017-0005, as publicly exploited at the time of release. Two weeks later Microsoft wrote up that exploit: it reached the kernel through a Win32k function pointer, and it ran only on 64 bit Windows 7 and Windows 8 because it checked for and avoided Windows 8.1 and Windows 10. Microsoft attributed its use to the activity group it calls ZIRCONIUM, and said the Windows 10 Anniversary Update of August 2016 had already added validation for that function pointer, with Supervisor Mode Execution Prevention and kernel address space randomisation raising the cost of the rest. Later records here move off graphics into COM and the kernel, and CISA lists CVE-2017-0213, a Windows COM Aggregate Marshaler flaw, as known to have been used in ransomware campaigns.
These are local privilege escalation records, so they matter after an attacker has a foothold rather than before one. The recurrence shows that platform mitigation, not any single patch, is what stopped a whole class of these exploits from running at all, so an old Windows build carries a different exposure from a current one even when both are patched.
This grouping says these records read alike. It does not say they share a vulnerability or an estate, and the fact that one Microsoft bulletin carried several of them does not mean one update closes another.
Written from learn.microsoft.com, microsoft.com, cisa.gov. Stated at medium confidence. Nothing in this box is a value the index holds, and none of it opens a receipt.
What this page does not cover
This is a family of records that read alike. It is not a shared vulnerability, not an inventory, and not a statement that one fix closes the rest. Each record's own state, its own dates and its own receipts are on its own page.
Grouped by shared product and weakness, not by shared vulnerability. Each record's own state is on its own page.
Everything this vendor has, including records outside this family:
24 records, read from the index as it stood on 20 Sep 2026. Every row opens the record it names, and every value on that record opens its own receipt.