Cisco ios, resource management errors: 23 records, one defect family
Cisco ios has been reported 23 separate times for the same kind of mistake, CWE-399, between 2017-03-22 and 2021-03-24. A defect family is our own grouping of the CVE corpus: every record naming one product and one weakness class, collected so a repeat is visible as a repeat. No public source publishes this, and what this page counts is how often this one product has gone wrong in this one way.
What this page is, and what it is not
The records are public. This grouping is not, and this one took more than a lookup. Every record here carries CWE-399, which matches exactly. The product name does not: the authorities wrote it 5 different ways, and no text match joins those strings, so a search for any one spelling finds a fraction of what exists and gives no sign the rest is there. Our own embedding, pro@dim2000, read those 5 groups, of 9, 5, 4, 3, 2 records, and found they name one product. That is how 23 records no public source connects came to be on one page, and it is the part you cannot look up. Every spelling stays printed beside its own records, because a judgement you cannot inspect is a judgement you should not cite, and if one of them is a different product this family is wrong and its count is wrong with it.
One record is an incident. 23 filings, between 2017-03-22 and 2021-03-24, all landing on the same weakness class in the same product, is a habit in what gets reported here, and a habit is something you can plan around. This is what we held on 2026-09-20.
A repeat is evidence about where to look. If you are reviewing Cisco ios, the records below say which mistake has already been found more than once, which is the cheapest place a reviewer can start. If you are asking the vendor a question, a count under one weakness class is a better question than any single record is.
What this page cannot tell you is decided by what was joined. A product name and a weakness class settled membership, so those two values are the whole of what the page asserts. Records here may sit in the same line of code or in unrelated parts of the product, and we hold no value that separates those cases. A fixed version named in one record closes that record and says nothing about the others. And nothing here describes anyone's systems, because no value in this family connects a product name to an installation.
The names the authorities used
5 different ways, each written by whoever filed the records under it. They are printed as written rather than tidied, because the tidying is the step that would hide what was merged.
Family membership: computed, pro@dim2000
What pulled them together
These records reached one family from 5 separate groups. A join on the product name alone could not see they were the same, because the authorities wrote the product and its versions differently each time. The grouping was computed by pro@dim2000.
What the records offer
No record in this family publishes a fixed version in held sources.
10 records are listed by CISA with a required action, which carries a federal remediation deadline on its own page.
The earliest was published 2017-03-22 and the latest 2021-03-24. That span is how long this product kept producing this weakness, not how long any one record took to fix.
What this family was researched, not held
Cisco IOS features that ran out of memory, buffers or queue
These records describe a device that stops carrying traffic, not one that gets taken over. Each names a Cisco IOS or IOS XE feature that held on to memory, buffers or queue space while processing ordinary protocol traffic, until the device reloaded or wedged. The Cisco Discovery Protocol record, CVE-2018-15373, is the plainest statement of the shape: Cisco gives the cause as improper memory handling when the software processes high rates of Cisco Discovery Protocol packets, says no workaround exists, and offers turning the protocol off as the mitigation. Most of these arrived on Cisco's fixed disclosure calendar, the fourth Wednesday of March and September, with 20 advisories bundled in March 2018 and 12 in September 2018 covering features including the Discovery Protocol, OSPFv3 and Precision Time Protocol.
The recurring shape is a protocol handler that keeps state for traffic it should have discarded, so availability is the loss to plan for rather than takeover. Where a named feature is not actually in use, Cisco's own mitigation for the Discovery Protocol record was to disable it, and the same question is worth asking of each feature listed here. Each record has its own advisory and its own fixed release.
This note does not establish that these records share a vulnerability, a code path, a fix or a device estate. They were grouped because they read alike, and fixing one of them does not address any other.
Written from blogs.cisco.com, blogs.cisco.com, cisco.com. Stated at medium confidence. Nothing in this box is a value the index holds, and none of it opens a receipt.
What this page does not cover
This is a family of records that read alike. It is not a shared vulnerability, not an inventory, and not a statement that one fix closes the rest. Each record's own state, its own dates and its own receipts are on its own page.
Grouped by shared product and weakness, not by shared vulnerability. Each record's own state is on its own page.
Everything this vendor has, including records outside this family:
23 records, read from the index as it stood on 20 Sep 2026. Every row opens the record it names, and every value on that record opens its own receipt.