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CVE-2026-98954

INDEX BUILT · 2026-10-24KEV AND EPSS READ 2026-10-24

The record is as the index held it on 2026-10-24. The KEV listing and the EPSS score were read on 2026-10-24. The score is dated to the day it became true. The KEV state is dated to that read. Changes between those two dates are not all shown.

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net: always dissect GSO packets in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()

CVE-2026-989542 of 4 sources documented this
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nothing this rule scores is held for this record, so there is no ordering to state. That is a fact about the sources, not a finding about the software.

Hindsight · the state

0.0021EPSSNOT IN KEVas of 2026-10-24
Severitynot scored
Harmnot stated
Exploitationnone in held sources
Defensefix version namedreceipt
Movementone observationreceipt
SINGLE READINGOne observation held. There is no shape yet. arc-rules@v1

Foresight · where to check next

No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.

Color is a claim, not decoration:the hostile worldthe defenseno signal

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ReachNo CVSS vector in held sources, so no reach or impact can be stated.
Weakness classNo CWE mapping in held sources.

CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA

The fix, and how long it's been waiting.

Fixed in4.15; 4.20; 4.21; 7.2.11; 7.3receipt
Patch available sinceNo dated patch-availability record in held sources. The index holds reference URLs without dates and only the current revision of the CVE record, so the day a fix first existed cannot be derived. Only the versions it landed in.
BOD 26-04 deadlineIf the system is reachable from the internet: 14 days. If not: fix at the next system upgrade.derived
Show full BOD 26-04 deadline

CISA has not scored it, so the directive's own defaults apply: automatable no, technical impact total. Calendar days from the KEV listing or from when you find it on a system, whichever is first. Federal agencies are bound from 7 Dec 2026, and contracts often carry it to suppliers. The directive and its table

Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score

Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.

  • RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
  • RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
  • RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
  • RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known

Authority who says so

Exploit probability0.0021receipt
Assigned byLinuxreceipt

Affected & Fixed Versions as published

Affected productLinuxreceipt
Fixed in4.15; 4.20; 4.21; 7.2.11; 7.3receipt

A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.

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What it is stated by the CNA

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: always dissect GSO packets in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() Commit 9e8db5913264 ("net: avoid false positives in untrusted gso validation") added a '&& skb->network_header' check before flow-dissecting GSO packets without VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(), because some callers (such as tun_get_user(), tun_xdp_one(), virtnet_receive_done(), and raw_verify_header()) called virtio_net_hdr_*_to_skb() before initializing skb->network_header and skb->dev. Because __alloc_skb() and __build_skb_around() zero-initialize skb->network_header to 0 (unlike mac_header and transport_header which are initialized to receipt

Read the rest of the CNA's description

~0U), those four callers always had skb->network_header == 0 and bypassed flow dissection in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb(). More generally, skb->network_header is an offset from skb->head (where 0 is also a valid offset whenever skb_headroom(skb) is 0), not a boolean flag. Whenever the 'if (gso_type && skb->network_header)' branch was skipped, the fallback 'else if (gso_type)' only pulled nh_min_len + thlen (40 bytes for TCPv4) without dissecting the packet, without validating ip_proto or n_proto, and without setting skb->transport_header. If the packet has a malformed network header, it is not rejected and a subsequent skb_probe_transport_header() also fails, leaving skb->transport_header at ~0U (0xffff). Similarly, if an IPv4 packet carries IP options (ihl > 5) or an IPv6 packet carries extension headers, pulling only nh_min_len + thlen can leave the TCP header outside skb->head. In both cases, tcp_hdrlen(skb) in skb_gso_transport_seglen() reads out-of-bounds: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in skb_gso_transport_seglen Read of size 2 by task poc/133 skb_gso_transport_seglen (net/core/gso.c:155) skb_gso_validate_mac_len (net/core/gso.c:270) tbf_enqueue (net/sched/sch_tbf.c:260) dev_qdisc_enqueue (net/core/dev.c:4227) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4884) In addition, checking virtio_net_hdr_match_proto() only inside 'if (!skb->protocol)' before flow dissection both skipped validation when skb->protocol was pre-set by the caller and rejected VLAN-tagged frames whose outer L2 protocol is ETH_P_8021Q or ETH_P_8021AD. Fix this by: 1. Initializing skb->dev and skb->network_header (plus skb->protocol for IFF_TUN) before virtio_net_hdr_*_to_skb() in tun_get_user(), tun_xdp_one(), virtnet_receive_done(), and raw_verify_header(). In tun_get_user(), drop the redundant skb_reset_mac_header(skb) in the IFF_TUN case since __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() unconditionally resets mac_header. 2. Removing '&& skb->network_header' and the unvalidated 'else if (gso_type)' fallback in __virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() so all GSO packets without VIRTIO_NET_HDR_F_NEEDS_CSUM are flow-dissected, have their transport header pulled into linear data, and have skb->transport_header set. 3. Moving the virtio_net_hdr_match_proto() check to after skb_flow_dissect_flow_keys_basic(), validating keys.basic.n_proto against hdr_gso_type.

check it yourself git.kernel.org git.kernel.org receipt

Movement

Only one observation of this value is held, so there is no movement to show yet.

The full biography

Published2026-10-23KEV and EPSS read2026-10-24

The record had been public for 1 day when this index was last written.

Published 2026-10-23 receipt · KEV and EPSS read 2026-10-24 derived

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