vciy

CVE-2026-98836

INDEX BUILT · 2026-10-19KEV AND EPSS READ 2026-10-19

The record is as the index held it on 2026-10-19. The KEV listing and the EPSS score were read on 2026-10-19. The score is dated to the day it became true. The KEV state is dated to that read. Changes between those two dates are not all shown.

No source can show you its own past. This one can.

Print this page to keep the view as it stands on this date. Everything hidden behind a disclosure opens, and every receipt prints with its value.

ALSA: line6: reject oversized playback packets

CVE-2026-988362 of 4 sources documented this
unranked

No rank

rank@v1 withholds a number for this record

nothing this rule scores is held for this record, so there is no ordering to state. That is a fact about the sources, not a finding about the software.

Hindsight · the state

0.00168EPSSNOT IN KEVas of 2026-10-19
Severitynot scored
Harmnot stated
Exploitationnone in held sources
Defensefix version namedreceipt
Movementone observationreceipt
SINGLE READINGOne observation held. There is no shape yet. arc-rules@v1

Foresight · where to check next

No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.

Color is a claim, not decoration:the hostile worldthe defenseno signal

Running Linux? Check your version

A deterministic range check against the ranges this record publishes. It tells you where a version sits in the record, not whether your deployment is exploitable. No account needed.

Watch this record

Matches your own product list against every record this index holds, and tells you when one of them moves.

What counts as a move

Watch Linux

Check your stack in the mirror · True as of 19 Oct 2026

Set up a watchlist (free with an account: one stack of three products)

Record your call

Keep your verdict, your reason and the evidence together. The record takes its date when you save it.

Patch by…

Or open an investigation: an incident or a near miss on this CVE, kept with its evidence where anyone in your organisation can find it.

Choose your verdict, then sign in or use an email link. Your first 100 records are free. Evidence is frozen when the record is created.

Private to your organization unless you share it. Put the proof link in your ticket so a reviewer can inspect the basis for your call. See how decision records work.

Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness

Written for the ticket you're about to file.

ReachNo CVSS vector in held sources, so no reach or impact can be stated.
Weakness classNo CWE mapping in held sources.

CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA

The fix, and how long it's been waiting.

Fixed in6.12.113; 6.18.56; 7.2.10receipt
Patch available sinceNo dated patch-availability record in held sources. The index holds reference URLs without dates and only the current revision of the CVE record, so the day a fix first existed cannot be derived. Only the versions it landed in.
BOD 26-04 deadlineIf the system is reachable from the internet: 14 days. If not: fix at the next system upgrade.derived
Show full BOD 26-04 deadline

CISA has not scored it, so the directive's own defaults apply: automatable no, technical impact total. Calendar days from the KEV listing or from when you find it on a system, whichever is first. Federal agencies are bound from 7 Dec 2026, and contracts often carry it to suppliers. The directive and its table

Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score

Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.

  • RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
  • RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
  • RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
  • RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known

Authority who says so

Exploit probability0.00168receipt
Assigned byLinuxreceipt

Affected & Fixed Versions as published

Affected productLinuxreceipt
Fixed in6.12.113; 6.18.56; 7.2.10receipt

A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.

Did this affect your environment?Answering needs an account.

What it is stated by the CNA

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: line6: reject oversized playback packets Each playback URB is handed a slice of out.buffer that is exactly LINE6_ISO_PACKETS * max_packet_size_out bytes, sized from the OUT endpoint, but the number of bytes written into that slice is never compared against it. submit_audio_out_urb() takes the frame count from prev_fsize, which audio_in_callback() derived from the *IN* endpoint's received packet length, and rescales it with the playback frame size; when prev_fsize is still zero it synthesizes a length from the sample rate instead. receipt

Read the rest of the CNA's description

On a device declaring a large IN wMaxPacketSize and a small OUT wMaxPacketSize, the resulting memcpy(), or the memset() when the playback stream is idle, runs past its slice and, as the reproducer below shows, beyond the allocation. usb_submit_urb() is not a backstop. max_packet_size_out comes from usb_maxpacket(), which returns only the low 11 bits of wMaxPacketSize, while USB core validates a high-speed isochronous length against that base scaled by usb_endpoint_maxp_mult(). A length of up to three times the allocated slice is therefore accepted, and even a rejected URB is only rejected after the write. Reject a packet that does not fit the slice the driver allocated for it. Clamping it instead would silently shorten the capture-derived rate feedback and desynchronize the two streams. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in submit_audio_out_urb (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:229) Write of size 1024 at addr ffff888100bbd400 by task kworker/1:2/5002 Workqueue: events line6_startup_work Call Trace: __asan_memcpy (mm/kasan/shadow.c:106) submit_audio_out_urb (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:229) line6_submit_audio_out_all_urbs (sound/usb/line6/playback.c:291) line6_stream_start (sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:194) line6_pcm_acquire (sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:337) line6_startup_work (sound/usb/line6/driver.c:728) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888100bbd400 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 256-byte region [ffff888100bbd400, ffff888100bbd500)

check it yourself git.kernel.org git.kernel.org git.kernel.org git.kernel.org receipt

Movement

Only one observation of this value is held, so there is no movement to show yet.

The full biography

Published2026-10-18KEV and EPSS read2026-10-19

The record had been public for 1 day when this index was last written.

Published 2026-10-18 receipt · KEV and EPSS read 2026-10-19 derived

Siblings and hubs

Records related to this one

Browse the index from here

These are index-wide views, not findings about CVE-2026-98836.

What usually comes next

Everything above needs no account. What is below is work: assembling it, scoping it to your estate, watching it, and handing it to someone else.

Everything on this page is free. Public data. Withholding it protects nothing.