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CVE-2026-98396

INDEX BUILT · 2026-10-18

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powerpc: Do not restore KUAP in arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare()

CVE-2026-983962 of 4 sources documented this
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Hindsight · the state

0.00198EPSSNOT IN KEVas of 2026-10-18
Severitynot scored
Harmnot stated
Exploitationnone in held sources
Defensefix version namedreceipt
Movementone observationreceipt
SINGLE READINGOne observation held. There is no shape yet. arc-rules@v1

Foresight · where to check next

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ReachNo CVSS vector in held sources, so no reach or impact can be stated.
Weakness classNo CWE mapping in held sources.

CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA

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Fixed in7.2.7receipt
Patch available sinceNo dated patch-availability record in held sources. The index holds reference URLs without dates and only the current revision of the CVE record, so the day a fix first existed cannot be derived. Only the versions it landed in.
BOD 26-04 deadlineIf the system is reachable from the internet: 14 days. If not: fix at the next system upgrade.derived
Show full BOD 26-04 deadline

CISA has not scored it, so the directive's own defaults apply: automatable no, technical impact total. Calendar days from the KEV listing or from when you find it on a system, whichever is first. Federal agencies are bound from 7 Dec 2026, and contracts often carry it to suppliers. The directive and its table

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Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.

  • RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
  • RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
  • RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
  • RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known

Authority who says so

Exploit probability0.00198 · top 91% of all CVEsreceipt
Assigned byLinuxreceipt
Recorded changes1 · last 18 Oct 2026derived

Affected & Fixed Versions as published

Affected productLinuxreceipt
Fixed in7.2.7receipt

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What it is stated by the CNA

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc: Do not restore KUAP in arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() KUAP means kernel cannot touch user memory unless it explicitly is enabled. In the kernel it should stay AMR_KUAP_BLOCKED. While returning to userspace just before RFI, kernel should restore the user AMR value back. Looks like GENERIC_ENTRY might be treating arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() as the last architecture step before returning to userspace. commit bee25f97ad24 ("powerpc: Enable GENERIC_ENTRY feature") therefore called kuap_user_restore() from that hook. But on PowerPC that is too early. receipt

Read the rest of the CNA's description

After irqentry_exit() / syscall_exit_to_user_mode() we still run platform specific exit routines. e.g. code snippets showing both exception handling and system call handling as the callers of function arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare() which does kuap_user_restore(). The below path shows that calling kuap_user_restore() is too early when called from arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(). Exception handling in exceptions-64s.S ======================================= bl CFUNC(do_page_fault) ..DEFINE_INTERRUPT_HANDLER_ASYNC(do_page_fault) arch_interrupt_async_enter_prepare(regs); state = irqentry_enter(regs); instrumentation_begin(); irq_enter_rcu(); handler(regs); nap_adjust_return(regs); irq_exit_rcu(); instrumentation_end(); arch_interrupt_async_exit_prepare(regs); irqentry_exit(regs, state); <<< too early irqentry_exit_to_user_mode() __exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs, EXIT_TO_USER_MODE_WORK_IRQ); arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs, ti_work); <<< too early b interrupt_return_srr .. bl CFUNC(interrupt_exit_user_prepare) <<< already calls kuap_user_restore prep_irq_for_enabled_exit() retry can run kernel code with IRQs on. So only when that routine is fully finished is when the user KUAP should be fully restored which interrupt_exit_user_prepare() already takes care of before returning. Similarly for system call handling in interrupt_64.S ====================================================== bl CFUNC(system_call_exception) .Lsyscall_exit: addi r4,r1,STACK_INT_FRAME_REGS li r5,0 /* !scv */ bl CFUNC(syscall_exit_prepare) .. kuap_assert_locked(); syscall_exit_to_user_mode(regs); <<< too early syscall_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(regs); <<< too early kuap_user_restore(regs); <<< already calls syscall_exit_prepare(), which can enable IRQs, replay a pending interrupt, and only then rfi. Those functions already restore KUAP immediately before rfi. Note that if we restore the user AMR too early like in the current code as shown from the code snippets above, then we get the following warning when CONFIG_PPC_KUAP_DEBUG is enabled: WARNING: arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup.h:293 at interrupt_exit_user_prepare+0x1a0/0x1c0 Hardware name: IBM pSeries (emulated by qemu) POWER10 (architected) TRAP: 0700 LR: c00000000000d8d4 CTR: c0000000021fe500 MSR: <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44000804 XER: 20040000 interrupt_exit_user_prepare+0x1a0/0x1c0 interrupt_return_srr_user+0x8/0x12c

check it yourself git.kernel.org git.kernel.org receipt

Movement

Only one observation of this value is held, so there is no movement to show yet.

The full biography

Published2026-10-14Index as of2026-10-15

The record had been public for 1 day when this index was last written.

Published 2026-10-14 receipt · Index as of 2026-10-15 derived

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