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CVE-2026-98375

INDEX BUILT · 2026-10-18

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xen/netfront: drop RX packets with a short Ethernet header

CVE-2026-983752 of 4 sources documented this
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nothing this rule scores is held for this record, so there is no ordering to state. That is a fact about the sources, not a finding about the software.

Hindsight · the state

0.00176EPSSNOT IN KEVas of 2026-10-18
Severitynot scored
Harmnot stated
Exploitationnone in held sources
Defensefix version namedreceipt
Movementsteadyreceipt
STEADY10Holding near 0.00 across 3 observations. arc-rules@v1

Foresight · where to check next

No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.

Color is a claim, not decoration:the hostile worldthe defenseno signal

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Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness

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ReachNo CVSS vector in held sources, so no reach or impact can be stated.
Weakness classNo CWE mapping in held sources.

CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA

The fix, and how long it's been waiting.

Fixed in6.12.113; 6.18.56; 7.2.10receipt
Patch available sinceNo dated patch-availability record in held sources. The index holds reference URLs without dates and only the current revision of the CVE record, so the day a fix first existed cannot be derived. Only the versions it landed in.
BOD 26-04 deadlineIf the system is reachable from the internet: 14 days. If not: fix at the next system upgrade.derived
Show full BOD 26-04 deadline

CISA has not scored it, so the directive's own defaults apply: automatable no, technical impact total. Calendar days from the KEV listing or from when you find it on a system, whichever is first. Federal agencies are bound from 7 Dec 2026, and contracts often carry it to suppliers. The directive and its table

Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score

Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.

  • RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
  • RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
  • RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
  • RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known

Authority who says so

Exploit probability0.00176 · top 93% of all CVEsreceipt
Assigned byLinuxreceipt
Recorded changes3 · last 18 Oct 2026derived

Affected & Fixed Versions as published

Affected productLinuxreceipt
Fixed in6.12.113; 6.18.56; 7.2.10receipt

A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.

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What it is stated by the CNA

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/netfront: drop RX packets with a short Ethernet header handle_incoming_queue() pulls pull_to bytes into the head before calling eth_type_trans(). pull_to is the length of the first RX slot, capped at RX_COPY_THRESHOLD, and that length comes from the backend. Nothing checks it against ETH_HLEN. If the first slot is shorter than ETH_HLEN and more slots follow, the head ends up shorter than an Ethernet header while skb->len is longer, and eth_type_trans() BUG()s in __skb_pull(). receipt

Read the rest of the CNA's description

If the whole packet is shorter than ETH_HLEN, eth_type_trans() reads the header past the end of the data instead. Pull at least ETH_HLEN, and drop the packet if that fails, which also drops packets too short to hold an Ethernet header. This also checks the return value of the pull, which was ignored.

check it yourself git.kernel.org git.kernel.org git.kernel.org git.kernel.org receipt

Movement the material steps

9 Oct 20260.00146
16 Oct 20260.00176
Show all 3 observations
9 Oct 20260.00146
12 Oct 20260.00171
16 Oct 20260.00176

3 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt

The full biography

EPSS 0.00176Published2026-10-09Index as of2026-10-16

The record had been public for 7 days when this index was last written.

Published 2026-10-09 receipt · Index as of 2026-10-16 derived

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