CVE-2026-63076
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Invalid Pointer Dereference in CMP Server via Crafted protectionAlg
rank 6 = 0 + 0 + 0 + 6 + 0
rank@v1 · backlog
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.01350 · without this subject the record ranks 6
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
no CVSS held by anyone · without this subject the record ranks 6
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 6
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
5 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 0
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 6
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.
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CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
Affected & Fixed Versions as published
Show all 5 published ranges
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What it is stated by the CNA
Issue summary: OpenSSL CMP password based protection verification only checks whether the protectionAlg parameter was not NULL and not its ASN.1 type, before treating it as a PBMParameter. A crafted message can contain a parameter of a different type, which is then dereferenced as an invalid pointer. Impact summary: A remote, unauthenticated attacker can crash an application acting as a CMP server that accepts PBM-protected messages, or a CMP client talking to a malicious or intercepted CMP server, resulting in a Denial of Service. CWE: CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference Description: When verifying the password-based MAC protection of a CMP message, OpenSSL library reads the protectionAlg receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
algorithm parameter with X509_ALGOR_get0(), which returns both the parameter type and its value pointer. The value is then cast to an ASN1_STRING and treated as the expected PBMParameter after only checking that pointer is not NULL. The parameter type returned by X509_ALGOR_get0() was never consulted. This happens during protection verification, before any MAC is computed, so no knowledge of the PBM shared secret is required; the only precondition is that PBM verification is reachable. On the server side this is reached from OSSL_CMP_SRV_process_request() for any application that stands up a CMP server accepting PBM-protected messages, and on the client side from CMP response validation against a malicious or on-path (MITM) server. The reliable consequence is a denial of service; there is no memory disclosure, no controlled memory write, and no path to code execution. CMP is a specialized feature that an application must explicitly enable. FIPS impact: no As the CMP code lives outside the FIPS module boundary, no FIPS modules are affected by this CVE.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- weakness
- CWE-476
- affected versions
- openssl >= 3.0.0 < 3.0.22; openssl >= 3.4.0 < 3.4.7; openssl >= 3.5.0 < 3.5.8; and 2 more, listed in full below
- also scored by
- 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
check it yourself openssl-library.org github.com github.com github.com github.com github.com receipt
Movement the material steps
Show all 2 observations
2 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
The record had been public for 20 days when this index was last written.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
None. No alias set, and nothing in the corpus cites this identifier or shares its product family within 60 days.
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What usually comes next
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