CVE-2026-32606
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IncusOS has a LUKS encryption bypass due to insufficient TPM policy
rank 34 = 15 + 19 + 0 + 0 + 0
rank@v1 · scheduled
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.00140 · without this subject the record ranks 19
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
CVSS 7.7, from the CNA · without this subject the record ranks 15
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 34
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
0 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 34
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 34
$6,990 = $4.99M incident cost x 1 exposure x 0.0014 likelihood
udv@v1 · unaudited · wrong for you until you say what you run
$4.99M is the cost of a breach that happened, from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026, global average. It is not the value of any asset of yours. That average already covers breaches of every severity, so scaling it by exposure understates a partial-impact record. That is an assumption, not a measurement. Your own asset value goes in the decision record.
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
This record is one instance of CWE-522, insufficiently protected credentials. The index holds 1501 prior instances of this class, 5 KEV-listed. The nearest of its KEV-listed records are drawn beside this. taxonomy@v1
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Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness
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CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Proof-of-concept published · 1 public repository, 2026-03-12.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published · 1 public repository2026-03-12receipt
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
Affected & Fixed Versions as published
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
Attack path
What it is stated by the CNA
IncusOS is an immutable OS image dedicated to running Incus. Prior to 202603142010, the default configuration of systemd-cryptenroll as used by IncusOS through mkosi allows for an attacker with physical access to the machine to access the encrypted data without requiring any interaction by the system's owner or any tampering of Secure Boot state or kernel (UKI) boot image. That's because in this configuration, the LUKS key is made available by the TPM so long as the system has the expected PCR7 value and the PCR11 policy matches. receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
That default PCR11 policy importantly allows for the TPM to release the key to the booted system rather than just from the initrd part of the signed kernel image (UKI). The attack relies on the attacker being able to substitute the original encrypted root partition for one that they control. By doing so, the system will prompt for a recovery key on boot, which the attacker has defined and can provide, before booting the system using the attacker's root partition rather than the system's original one. The attacker only needs to put a systemd unit starting on system boot within their root partition to have the system run that logic on boot. That unit will then run in an environment where the TPM will allow for the retrieval of the encryption key of the real root disk, allowing the attacker to steal the LUKS volume key (immutable master key) and then use it against the real root disk, altering it or getting data out before putting the disk back the way it was and returning the system without a trace of this attack having happened. This is all possible because the system will have still booted with Secure Boot enabled, will have measured and ran the expected bootloader and kernel image (UKI). The initrd selects the root disk based on GPT partition identifiers making it possible to easily substitute the real root disk for an attacker controlled one. This doesn't lead to any change in the TPM state and therefore allows for retrieval of the LUKS key by the attacker through a boot time systemd unit on their alternative root partition. IncusOS version 202603142010 (2026/03/14 20:10 UTC) includes the new PCR15 logic and will automatically update the TPM policy on boot. Anyone suspecting that their system may have been physically accessed while shut down should perform a full system wipe and reinstallation as only that will rotate the LUKS volume key and prevent subsequent access to the encrypted data should the system have been previously compromised. There are no known workarounds other than updating to a version with corrected logic which will automatically rebind the LUKS keys to the new set of TPM registers and prevent this from being exploited.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- weakness
- CWE-522
- also scored by
- [email protected] 7.6 CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
check it yourself github.com github.com github.com discuss.linuxcontainers.org oddlama.org receipt
Movement the material steps
Show all 5 observations
5 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The pattern, elsewhere
This record is one instance of CWE-522, insufficiently protected credentials. The index holds 1501 prior instances of this class, 5 KEV-listed. The nearest of its KEV-listed records are drawn beside this. [email protected]
"Matches n of m" counts the attributes the two records can both be compared on: the CVSS metrics they share a version of, any weakness class beyond this one, and the vendor. fit-rules@v1
1501 records in this class held. The six above are drawn from the ones CISA has listed as exploited, ranked by how much of the record matches this one. That is why every one of them is KEV-listed: the pool is, so the colour on those spokes says nothing the pool has not already said.
No curated product neighbourhood is held for this product, so the records above are the nearest this index can name. The neighbourhood table covers a small set of products and is extended by hand.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
None. No alias set, and nothing in the corpus cites this identifier or shares its product family within 60 days.
Browse the index from here
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What usually comes next
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