CVE-2024-47813
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Wasmtime race condition could lead to WebAssembly control-flow integrity and type safety violations
rank 16 = 0 + 7 + 0 + 9 + 0
rank@v1 · backlog
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.00153 · without this subject the record ranks 16
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
CVSS 2.9, from the CNA · without this subject the record ranks 9
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 16
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
15 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 7
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 16
$3,270 = $4.99M incident cost x 0.42806422275080447 exposure x 0.00153 likelihood
udv@v1 · unaudited · wrong for you until you say what you run
$4.99M is the cost of a breach that happened, from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026, global average. It is not the value of any asset of yours. That average already covers breaches of every severity, so scaling it by exposure understates a partial-impact record. That is an assumption, not a measurement. Your own asset value goes in the decision record.
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
This record is one instance of CWE-367, time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition. The index holds 833 prior instances of this class, 6 KEV-listed. The nearest of its KEV-listed records are drawn beside this. taxonomy@v1
Running bytecodealliance wasmtime? Check your version
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Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness
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CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
Affected & Fixed Versions as published
Show all 15 published ranges
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
What it is stated by the CNA
Wasmtime is an open source runtime for WebAssembly. Under certain concurrent event orderings, a `wasmtime::Engine`'s internal type registry was susceptible to double-unregistration bugs due to a race condition, leading to panics and potentially type registry corruption. That registry corruption could, following an additional and particular sequence of concurrent events, lead to violations of WebAssembly's control-flow integrity (CFI) and type safety. Users that do not use `wasmtime::Engine` across multiple threads are not affected. Users that only create new modules across threads over time are additionally not affected. receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
Reproducing this bug requires creating and dropping multiple type instances (such as `wasmtime::FuncType` or `wasmtime::ArrayType`) concurrently on multiple threads, where all types are associated with the same `wasmtime::Engine`. **Wasm guests cannot trigger this bug.** See the "References" section below for a list of Wasmtime types-related APIs that are affected. Wasmtime maintains an internal registry of types within a `wasmtime::Engine` and an engine is shareable across threads. Types can be created and referenced through creation of a `wasmtime::Module`, creation of `wasmtime::FuncType`, or a number of other APIs where the host creates a function (see "References" below). Each of these cases interacts with an engine to deduplicate type information and manage type indices that are used to implement type checks in WebAssembly's `call_indirect` function, for example. This bug is a race condition in this management where the internal type registry could be corrupted to trigger an assert or contain invalid state. Wasmtime's internal representation of a type has individual types (e.g. one-per-host-function) maintain a registration count of how many time it's been used. Types additionally have state within an engine behind a read-write lock such as lookup/deduplication information. The race here is a time-of-check versus time-of-use (TOCTOU) bug where one thread atomically decrements a type entry's registration count, observes zero registrations, and then acquires a lock in order to unregister that entry. However, between when this first thread observed the zero-registration count and when it acquires that lock, another thread could perform the following sequence of events: re-register another copy of the type, which deduplicates to that same entry, resurrecting it and incrementing its registration count; then drop the type and decrement its registration count; observe that the registration count is now zero; acquire the type registry lock; and finally unregister the type. Now, when the original thread finally acquires the lock and unregisters the entry, it is the second time this entry has been unregistered. This bug was originally introduced in Wasmtime 19's development of the WebAssembly GC proposal. This bug affects users who are not using the GC proposal, however, and affects Wasmtime in its default configuration even when the GC proposal is disabled. Wasmtime users using 19.0.0 and after are all affected by this issue. We have released the following Wasmtime versions, all of which have a fix for this bug: * 21.0.2 * 22.0.1 * 23.0.3 * 24.0.1 * 25.0.2. If your application creates and drops Wasmtime types on multiple threads concurrently, there are no known workarounds. Users are encouraged to upgrade to a patched release.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- weakness
- CWE-367
- affected versions
- bytecodealliance wasmtime 19.0.0; bytecodealliance wasmtime 19.0.1; bytecodealliance wasmtime 19.0.2; and 12 more, listed in full below
- also scored by
- [email protected] 2.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
check it yourself github.com github.com receipt
Movement the material steps
This score more than doubled inside 72 hours. Both observations are in the full history below.
Show all 12 observations
12 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
Exploit probability more than doubled between 2025-11-17 and 2025-11-18 (0.00013 → 0.00042) and the record had been public for 1 year, 9 months when this index was last written.
The pattern, elsewhere
This record is one instance of CWE-367, time-of-check time-of-use (toctou) race condition. The index holds 833 prior instances of this class, 6 KEV-listed. The nearest of its KEV-listed records are drawn beside this. [email protected]
"Matches n of m" counts the attributes the two records can both be compared on: the CVSS metrics they share a version of, any weakness class beyond this one, and the vendor. fit-rules@v1
833 records in this class held. The six above are drawn from the ones CISA has listed as exploited, ranked by how much of the record matches this one. That is why every one of them is KEV-listed: the pool is, so the colour on those spokes says nothing the pool has not already said.
No curated product neighbourhood is held for this product, so the records above are the nearest this index can name. The neighbourhood table covers a small set of products and is extended by hand.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
None. No alias set, and nothing in the corpus cites this identifier or shares its product family within 60 days.
Browse the index from here
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What usually comes next
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