CVE-2024-12797
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RFC7250 handshakes with unauthenticated servers don't abort as expected
rank 1 = 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0
rank@v1 · backlog
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.02531 · without this subject the record ranks 0
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
no CVSS held by anyone · without this subject the record ranks 1
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 1
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
0 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 1
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 1
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.
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Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness
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CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
What it is stated by the CNA
Issue summary: Clients using RFC7250 Raw Public Keys (RPKs) to authenticate a server may fail to notice that the server was not authenticated, because handshakes don't abort as expected when the SSL_VERIFY_PEER verification mode is set. Impact summary: TLS and DTLS connections using raw public keys may be vulnerable to man-in-middle attacks when server authentication failure is not detected by clients. RPKs are disabled by default in both TLS clients and TLS servers. The issue only arises when TLS clients explicitly enable RPK use by the server, and the server, likewise, enables sending of an RPK instead of an X.509 certificate chain. receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
The affected clients are those that then rely on the handshake to fail when the server's RPK fails to match one of the expected public keys, by setting the verification mode to SSL_VERIFY_PEER. Clients that enable server-side raw public keys can still find out that raw public key verification failed by calling SSL_get_verify_result(), and those that do, and take appropriate action, are not affected. This issue was introduced in the initial implementation of RPK support in OpenSSL 3.2. The FIPS modules in 3.4, 3.3, 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- weakness
- CWE-392
- also scored by
- 6.3 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
check it yourself openssl-library.org github.com github.com github.com receipt
Movement the material steps
This score more than doubled inside 72 hours. Both observations are in the full history below.
Show all 59 observations
59 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
Exploit probability more than doubled between 2025-03-17 and 2025-03-19 (0.00274 → 0.0248) and the record had been public for 1 year, 6 months when this index was last written.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
None. No alias set, and nothing in the corpus cites this identifier or shares its product family within 60 days.
Browse the index from here
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What usually comes next
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