CVE-2024-0727
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PKCS12 Decoding crashes
rank 21 = 1 + 14 + 0 + 6 + 0
rank@v1 · backlog
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.03187 · without this subject the record ranks 20
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
CVSS 5.5, from NVD · without this subject the record ranks 7
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 21
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
5 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 15
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 21
$97,400 = $4.99M incident cost x 0.6121449559255632 exposure x 0.03187 likelihood
udv@v1 · unaudited · wrong for you until you say what you run
$4.99M is the cost of a breach that happened, from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026, global average. It is not the value of any asset of yours. That average already covers breaches of every severity, so scaling it by exposure understates a partial-impact record. That is an assumption, not a measurement. Your own asset value goes in the decision record.
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.
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Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness
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CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
Affected & Fixed Versions as published
Show all 5 published ranges
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
What it is stated by the CNA
Issue summary: Processing a maliciously formatted PKCS12 file may lead OpenSSL to crash leading to a potential Denial of Service attack Impact summary: Applications loading files in the PKCS12 format from untrusted sources might terminate abruptly. A file in PKCS12 format can contain certificates and keys and may come from an untrusted source. The PKCS12 specification allows certain fields to be NULL, but OpenSSL does not correctly check for this case. This can lead to a NULL pointer dereference that results in OpenSSL crashing. receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
If an application processes PKCS12 files from an untrusted source using the OpenSSL APIs then that application will be vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL APIs that are vulnerable to this are: PKCS12_parse(), PKCS12_unpack_p7data(), PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata(), PKCS12_unpack_authsafes() and PKCS12_newpass(). We have also fixed a similar issue in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). However since this function is related to writing data we do not consider it security significant. The FIPS modules in 3.2, 3.1 and 3.0 are not affected by this issue.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- severity
- 5.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- weakness
- CWE-476
- affected versions
- openssl >= 1.0.2 < 1.0.2zj; openssl >= 1.1.1 < 1.1.1x; openssl >= 3.0.0 < 3.0.13; and 2 more, listed in full below
- also scored by
- 5.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
check it yourself openssl.org github.com github.com github.com github.openssl.org github.openssl.org receipt
Movement the material steps
This score more than doubled inside 72 hours. Both observations are in the full history below.
Show all 76 observations
76 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
Exploit probability more than doubled between 2024-01-31 and 2024-02-03 (0.00044 → 0.00228) and the record had been public for 2 years, 5 months when this index was last written.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
None. No alias set, and nothing in the corpus cites this identifier or shares its product family within 60 days.
Browse the index from here
These are index-wide views, not findings about CVE-2024-0727.
What usually comes next
Everything above needs no account. What is below is work: assembling it, scoping it to your estate, watching it, and handing it to someone else.