CVE-2023-6237
No source can show you its own past. This one can.
Print this page to keep the view as it stands on this date. Everything hidden behind a disclosure opens, and every receipt prints with its value.
Excessive time spent checking invalid RSA public keys
rank 1 = 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0
rank@v1 · backlog
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.02303 · without this subject the record ranks 0
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
no CVSS held by anyone · without this subject the record ranks 1
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 1
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
0 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 1
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 1
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.
Running OpenSSL? Check your version
A deterministic range check against the ranges this record publishes. It tells you where a version sits in the record, not whether your deployment is exploitable. No account needed.
Watch this record
Matches your own product list against every record this index holds, and tells you when one of them moves.
Set up a watchlist (needs a Practitioner account)
Record your call
Keep your verdict, your reason and the evidence together. The record takes its date when you save it.
AcceptDeferPatch by…Not affectedMitigatedChoose your verdict, then sign in or use an email link. Your first 100 records are free. Evidence is frozen when the record is created.
Private to your organization unless you share it. Put the proof link in your ticket so a reviewer can inspect the basis for your call. See how decision records work.
Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness
Written for the ticket you're about to file.
CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
What it is stated by the CNA
Issue summary: Checking excessively long invalid RSA public keys may take a long time. Impact summary: Applications that use the function EVP_PKEY_public_check() to check RSA public keys may experience long delays. Where the key that is being checked has been obtained from an untrusted source this may lead to a Denial of Service. When function EVP_PKEY_public_check() is called on RSA public keys, a computation is done to confirm that the RSA modulus, n, is composite. For valid RSA keys, n is a product of two or more large primes and this computation completes quickly. receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
However, if n is an overly large prime, then this computation would take a long time. An application that calls EVP_PKEY_public_check() and supplies an RSA key obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack. The function EVP_PKEY_public_check() is not called from other OpenSSL functions however it is called from the OpenSSL pkey command line application. For that reason that application is also vulnerable if used with the '-pubin' and '-check' options on untrusted data. The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected by this issue. The OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1 FIPS providers are affected by this issue.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- weakness
- CWE-606
- also scored by
- 5.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
check it yourself openssl.org github.com github.com github.com receipt
Movement the material steps
This score more than doubled inside 72 hours. Both observations are in the full history below.
Show all 36 observations
36 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
Exploit probability more than doubled between 2025-03-28 and 2025-03-29 (0.00539 → 0.01167) and the record had been public for 2 years, 1 month when this index was last written.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
No record cites this identifier and it carries no alias. Its defect family is below.
Its defect family
openssl
Of the 5 records in this family, this is the only one holding a stated fix version: 3.0.13; 3.1.5; 3.2.1.
Grouped by shared product and weakness, not by shared vulnerability. Each record's own state is on its own page.
Family membership: held values
This record is one of a group, and the group's page describes all of them. This page is kept and dated, and the defect family's own page is the one we offer for indexing: the whole group.
Browse the index from here
These are index-wide views, not findings about CVE-2023-6237.
What usually comes next
Everything above needs no account. What is below is work: assembling it, scoping it to your estate, watching it, and handing it to someone else.