CVE-2023-5363
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Incorrect cipher key & IV length processing
rank 26 = 1 + 19 + 1 + 5 + 0
rank@v1 · scheduled
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.03332 · without this subject the record ranks 25
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
CVSS 7.5, from NVD · without this subject the record ranks 7
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
rose on 2025-11-04 · without this subject the record ranks 25
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
3 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 21
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 26
$102,000 = $4.99M incident cost x 0.6121449559255632 exposure x 0.03332 likelihood
udv@v1 · unaudited · wrong for you until you say what you run
$4.99M is the cost of a breach that happened, from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026, global average. It is not the value of any asset of yours. That average already covers breaches of every severity, so scaling it by exposure understates a partial-impact record. That is an assumption, not a measurement. Your own asset value goes in the decision record.
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.
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The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
What it is stated by the CNA
Issue summary: A bug has been identified in the processing of key and initialisation vector (IV) lengths. This can lead to potential truncation or overruns during the initialisation of some symmetric ciphers. Impact summary: A truncation in the IV can result in non-uniqueness, which could result in loss of confidentiality for some cipher modes. When calling EVP_EncryptInit_ex2(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex2() or EVP_CipherInit_ex2() the provided OSSL_PARAM array is processed after the key and IV have been established. receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
Any alterations to the key length, via the "keylen" parameter or the IV length, via the "ivlen" parameter, within the OSSL_PARAM array will not take effect as intended, potentially causing truncation or overreading of these values. The following ciphers and cipher modes are impacted: RC2, RC4, RC5, CCM, GCM and OCB. For the CCM, GCM and OCB cipher modes, truncation of the IV can result in loss of confidentiality. For example, when following NIST's SP 800-38D section 8.2.1 guidance for constructing a deterministic IV for AES in GCM mode, truncation of the counter portion could lead to IV reuse. Both truncations and overruns of the key and overruns of the IV will produce incorrect results and could, in some cases, trigger a memory exception. However, these issues are not currently assessed as security critical. Changing the key and/or IV lengths is not considered to be a common operation and the vulnerable API was recently introduced. Furthermore it is likely that application developers will have spotted this problem during testing since decryption would fail unless both peers in the communication were similarly vulnerable. For these reasons we expect the probability of an application being vulnerable to this to be quite low. However if an application is vulnerable then this issue is considered very serious. For these reasons we have assessed this issue as Moderate severity overall. The OpenSSL SSL/TLS implementation is not affected by this issue. The OpenSSL 3.0 and 3.1 FIPS providers are not affected by this because the issue lies outside of the FIPS provider boundary. OpenSSL 3.1 and 3.0 are vulnerable to this issue.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- severity
- 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- weakness
- CWE-684
- affected versions
- openssl >= 3.0.0 < 3.0.12; openssl >= 3.1.0 < 3.1.4; debian linux 12.0
- also scored by
- 7.5 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
check it yourself openssl.org git.openssl.org git.openssl.org receipt
Dated events
Movement the material steps
This score more than doubled inside 72 hours. Both observations are in the full history below.
Show all 69 observations
69 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
Exploit probability more than doubled between 2025-03-25 and 2025-03-27 (0.05734 → 0.36712) and the record had been public for 2 years, 7 months when this index was last written.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
None. No alias set, and nothing in the corpus cites this identifier or shares its product family within 60 days.
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What usually comes next
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