CVE-2023-52452
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bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots
rank 24 = 0 + 20 + 0 + 4 + 0
rank@v1 · backlog
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.00239 · without this subject the record ranks 24
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
CVSS 7.8, from NVD · without this subject the record ranks 4
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 24
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
2 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 20
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 24
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
This record is one instance of CWE-665, improper initialization. The index holds 364 prior instances of this class, 3 KEV-listed. The nearest of its KEV-listed records are drawn beside this. taxonomy@v1
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Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness
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CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Show full BOD 26-04 deadline
CISA has not scored it, so the directive's own defaults apply: automatable no, technical impact total. Calendar days from the KEV listing or from when you find it on a system, whichever is first. Federal agencies are bound from 7 Dec 2026, and contracts often carry it to suppliers. The directive and its table
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
$11,900 = $4.99M incident cost x 1 exposure x 0.00239 likelihood
udv@v1 · unaudited · wrong for you until you say what you run
$4.99M is the cost of a breach that happened, from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026, global average. It is not the value of any asset of yours. That average already covers breaches of every severity, so scaling it by exposure understates a partial-impact record. That is an assumption, not a measurement. Your own asset value goes in the decision record.
What it is stated by the CNA
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots Privileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack memory (ever since 6715df8d5) but, before this patch, these accesses were permitted inconsistently. In particular, accesses were permitted above state->allocated_stack, but not below it. In other words, if the stack was already "large enough", the access was permitted, but otherwise the access was rejected instead of being allowed to "grow the stack". receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
This undesired rejection was happening in two places: - in check_stack_slot_within_bounds() - in check_stack_range_initialized() This patch arranges for these accesses to be permitted. A bunch of tests that were relying on the old rejection had to change; all of them were changed to add also run unprivileged, in which case the old behavior persists. One tests couldn't be updated - global_func16 - because it can't run unprivileged for other reasons. This patch also fixes the tracking of the stack size for variable-offset reads. This second fix is bundled in the same commit as the first one because they're inter-related. Before this patch, writes to the stack using registers containing a variable offset (as opposed to registers with fixed, known values) were not properly contributing to the function's needed stack size. As a result, it was possible for a program to verify, but then to attempt to read out-of-bounds data at runtime because a too small stack had been allocated for it. Each function tracks the size of the stack it needs in bpf_subprog_info.stack_depth, which is maintained by update_stack_depth(). For regular memory accesses, check_mem_access() was calling update_state_depth() but it was passing in only the fixed part of the offset register, ignoring the variable offset. This was incorrect; the minimum possible value of that register should be used instead. This tracking is now fixed by centralizing the tracking of stack size in grow_stack_state(), and by lifting the calls to grow_stack_state() to check_stack_access_within_bounds() as suggested by Andrii. The code is now simpler and more convincingly tracks the correct maximum stack size. check_stack_range_initialized() can now rely on enough stack having been allocated for the access; this helps with the fix for the first issue. A few tests were changed to also check the stack depth computation. The one that fails without this patch is verifier_var_off:stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- severity
- 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
- weakness
- CWE-665
- affected versions
- linux kernel >= 5.12 < 6.6.14; linux kernel >= 6.7.0 < 6.7.2
check it yourself git.kernel.org git.kernel.org git.kernel.org receipt
Movement the material steps
Show all 10 observations
10 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
The record had been public for 2 years, 3 months when this index was last written.
The pattern, elsewhere
This record is one instance of CWE-665, improper initialization. The index holds 364 prior instances of this class, 3 KEV-listed. The nearest of its KEV-listed records are drawn beside this. cwe-consequences@4.20
"Matches n of m" counts the attributes the two records can both be compared on: the CVSS metrics they share a version of, any weakness class beyond this one, and the vendor. fit-rules@v1
364 records in this class held. The six above are drawn from the ones CISA has listed as exploited, ranked by how much of the record matches this one. That is why every one of them is KEV-listed: the pool is, so the colour on those spokes says nothing the pool has not already said.
No curated product neighbourhood is held for this product, so the records above are the nearest this index can name. The neighbourhood table covers a small set of products and is extended by hand.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
No record cites this identifier and it carries no alias. Its defect family is below.
Its defect family
linux
Of the 12 records in this family, this is the only one holding a stated fix version: 0954982db8283016bf38e9db2da5adf47a102e19; 6b4a64bafd107e521c.
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What usually comes next
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