CVE-2023-28841
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moby/moby's dockerd daemon encrypted overlay network traffic may be unencrypted
rank 21 = 0 + 17 + 0 + 4 + 0
rank@v1 · backlog
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.00691 · without this subject the record ranks 21
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
CVSS 6.8, from NVD · without this subject the record ranks 4
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 21
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
2 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 17
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 21
$21,100 = $4.99M incident cost x 0.6121449559255632 exposure x 0.00691 likelihood
udv@v1 · unaudited · wrong for you until you say what you run
$4.99M is the cost of a breach that happened, from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026, global average. It is not the value of any asset of yours. That average already covers breaches of every severity, so scaling it by exposure understates a partial-impact record. That is an assumption, not a measurement. Your own asset value goes in the decision record.
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.
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Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness
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CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
Attack path
What it is stated by the CNA
Moby is an open source container framework developed by Docker Inc. that is distributed as Docker, Mirantis Container Runtime, and various other downstream projects/products. The Moby daemon component (`dockerd`), which is developed as moby/moby is commonly referred to as *Docker*. Swarm Mode, which is compiled in and delivered by default in `dockerd` and is thus present in most major Moby downstreams, is a simple, built-in container orchestrator that is implemented through a combination of SwarmKit and supporting network code. The `overlay` network driver is a core feature of Swarm Mode, providing isolated virtual LANs that allow communication between containers and services across the cl receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
uster. This driver is an implementation/user of VXLAN, which encapsulates link-layer (Ethernet) frames in UDP datagrams that tag the frame with the VXLAN metadata, including a VXLAN Network ID (VNI) that identifies the originating overlay network. In addition, the overlay network driver supports an optional, off-by-default encrypted mode, which is especially useful when VXLAN packets traverses an untrusted network between nodes. Encrypted overlay networks function by encapsulating the VXLAN datagrams through the use of the IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload protocol in Transport mode. By deploying IPSec encapsulation, encrypted overlay networks gain the additional properties of source authentication through cryptographic proof, data integrity through check-summing, and confidentiality through encryption. When setting an endpoint up on an encrypted overlay network, Moby installs three iptables (Linux kernel firewall) rules that enforce both incoming and outgoing IPSec. These rules rely on the `u32` iptables extension provided by the `xt_u32` kernel module to directly filter on a VXLAN packet's VNI field, so that IPSec guarantees can be enforced on encrypted overlay networks without interfering with other overlay networks or other users of VXLAN. An iptables rule designates outgoing VXLAN datagrams with a VNI that corresponds to an encrypted overlay network for IPsec encapsulation. Encrypted overlay networks on affected platforms silently transmit unencrypted data. As a result, `overlay` networks may appear to be functional, passing traffic as expected, but without any of the expected confidentiality or data integrity guarantees. It is possible for an attacker sitting in a trusted position on the network to read all of the application traffic that is moving across the overlay network, resulting in unexpected secrets or user data disclosure. Thus, because many database protocols, internal APIs, etc. are not protected by a second layer of encryption, a user may use Swarm encrypted overlay networks to provide confidentiality, which due to this vulnerability this is no longer guaranteed. Patches are available in Moby releases 23.0.3, and 20.10.24. As Mirantis Container Runtime's 20.10 releases are numbered differently, users of that platform should update to 20.10.16. Some workarounds are available. Close the VXLAN port (by default, UDP port 4789) to outgoing traffic at the Internet boundary in order to prevent unintentionally leaking unencrypted traffic over the Internet, and/or ensure that the `xt_u32` kernel module is available on all nodes of the Swarm cluster.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- severity
- 6.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- weakness
- CWE-311; CWE-636; CWE-755
- affected versions
- mobyproject moby >= 1.12.0 < 20.10.24; mobyproject moby >= 23.0.0 < 23.0.3
- also scored by
- [email protected] 6.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
check it yourself github.com github.com github.com github.com github.com github.com +5 morereceipt
Movement the material steps
This score more than doubled inside 72 hours. Both observations are in the full history below.
Show all 35 observations
35 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
Exploit probability more than doubled between 2025-11-18 and 2025-11-21 (0.00506 → 0.02777) and the record had been public for 3 years, 4 months when this index was last written.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
None. No alias set, and nothing in the corpus cites this identifier or shares its product family within 60 days.
Browse the index from here
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What usually comes next
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