CVE-2023-26489
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Guest-controlled out-of-bounds read/write on x86_64 in wasmtime
rank 31 = 0 + 25 + 0 + 6 + 0
rank@v1 · scheduled
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.01261 · without this subject the record ranks 31
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
CVSS 9.9, from NVD · without this subject the record ranks 6
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 31
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
6 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 25
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 31
$62,900 = $4.99M incident cost x 1 exposure x 0.01261 likelihood
udv@v1 · unaudited · wrong for you until you say what you run
$4.99M is the cost of a breach that happened, from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026, global average. It is not the value of any asset of yours. That average already covers breaches of every severity, so scaling it by exposure understates a partial-impact record. That is an assumption, not a measurement. Your own asset value goes in the decision record.
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
This record is one instance of CWE-125, out-of-bounds read. The index holds 9767 prior instances of this class, 19 KEV-listed. The nearest of its KEV-listed records are drawn beside this. taxonomy@v1
Sources disagree here.
Both shown, dated. We don't pick winners. disagreement-rules@v1
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Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness
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CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
Affected & Fixed Versions as published
Show all 6 published ranges
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
Attack path
What it is stated by the CNA
wasmtime is a fast and secure runtime for WebAssembly. In affected versions wasmtime's code generator, Cranelift, has a bug on x86_64 targets where address-mode computation mistakenly would calculate a 35-bit effective address instead of WebAssembly's defined 33-bit effective address. This bug means that, with default codegen settings, a wasm-controlled load/store operation could read/write addresses up to 35 bits away from the base of linear memory. Due to this bug, however, addresses up to `0xffffffff * 8 + 0x7ffffffc = 36507222004 = ~34G` bytes away from the base of linear memory are possible from guest code. receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
This means that the virtual memory 6G away from the base of linear memory up to ~34G away can be read/written by a malicious module. A guest module can, without the knowledge of the embedder, read/write memory in this region. The memory may belong to other WebAssembly instances when using the pooling allocator, for example. Affected embedders are recommended to analyze preexisting wasm modules to see if they're affected by the incorrect codegen rules and possibly correlate that with an anomalous number of traps during historical execution to locate possibly suspicious modules. The specific bug in Cranelift's x86_64 backend is that a WebAssembly address which is left-shifted by a constant amount from 1 to 3 will get folded into x86_64's addressing modes which perform shifts. For example `(i32.load (i32.shl (local.get 0) (i32.const 3)))` loads from the WebAssembly address `$local0 << 3`. When translated to Cranelift the `$local0 << 3` computation, a 32-bit value, is zero-extended to a 64-bit value and then added to the base address of linear memory. Cranelift would generate an instruction of the form `movl (%base, %local0, 8), %dst` which calculates `%base + %local0 << 3`. The bug here, however, is that the address computation happens with 64-bit values, where the `$local0 << 3` computation was supposed to be truncated to a a 32-bit value. This means that `%local0`, which can use up to 32-bits for an address, gets 3 extra bits of address space to be accessible via this `movl` instruction. The fix in Cranelift is to remove the erroneous lowering rules in the backend which handle these zero-extended expression. The above example is then translated to `movl %local0, %temp; shl $3, %temp; movl (%base, %temp), %dst` which correctly truncates the intermediate computation of `%local0 << 3` to 32-bits inside the `%temp` register which is then added to the `%base` value. Wasmtime version 4.0.1, 5.0.1, and 6.0.1 have been released and have all been patched to no longer contain the erroneous lowering rules. While updating Wasmtime is recommended, there are a number of possible workarounds that embedders can employ to mitigate this issue if updating is not possible. Note that none of these workarounds are on-by-default and require explicit configuration: 1. The `Config::static_memory_maximum_size(0)` option can be used to force all accesses to linear memory to be explicitly bounds-checked. This will perform a bounds check separately from the address-mode computation which correctly calculates the effective address of a load/store. Note that this can have a large impact on the execution performance of WebAssembly modules. 2. The `Config::static_memory_guard_size(1 << 36)` option can be used to greatly increase the guard pages placed after linear memory. This will guarantee that memory accesses up-to-34G away are guaranteed to be semantically correct by reserving unmapped memory for the instance. Note that this reserves a very large amount of virtual memory per-instances and can greatly reduce the maximum number of concurrent instances being run. 3. If using a non-x86_64 host is possible, then that will also work around this bug. This bug does not affect Wasmtime's or Cranelift's AArch64 backend, for example.
NVD's analysis a second authority
- severity
- 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
- weakness
- CWE-125; CWE-787
- affected versions
- bytecodealliance cranelift-codegen >= 0.84.0 < 0.91.1; bytecodealliance cranelift-codegen 0.92.0; bytecodealliance cranelift-codegen 0.93.0; and 3 more, listed in full below
- also scored by
- [email protected] 9.9 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The CNA scored it 10 and NVD 9.9. Both are shown because both were published; we do not pick one.
check it yourself github.com github.com docs.rs docs.rs groups.google.com receipt
Movement the material steps
Show all 38 observations
38 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
The record had been public for 3 years, 4 months when this index was last written.
The pattern, elsewhere
This record is one instance of CWE-125, out-of-bounds read. The index holds 9767 prior instances of this class, 19 KEV-listed. The nearest of its KEV-listed records are drawn beside this. [email protected]
"Matches n of m" counts the attributes the two records can both be compared on: the CVSS metrics they share a version of, any weakness class beyond this one, and the vendor. fit-rules@v1
9767 records in this class held. The six above are drawn from the ones CISA has listed as exploited, ranked by how much of the record matches this one. That is why every one of them is KEV-listed: the pool is, so the colour on those spokes says nothing the pool has not already said.
No curated product neighbourhood is held for this product, so the records above are the nearest this index can name. The neighbourhood table covers a small set of products and is extended by hand.
Siblings and hubs
Records related to this one
No record cites this identifier and it carries no alias. Its defect family is below.
Its defect family
bytecodealliance wasmtime
Of the 6 records in this family that state one, this holds the highest EPSS percentile: 0.67628.
Grouped by shared product and weakness, not by shared vulnerability. Each record's own state is on its own page.
Family membership: held values
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What usually comes next
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