CVE-2021-24105
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Package Managers Configurations Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
rank 18 = 1 + 17 + 0 + 0 + 0
rank@v1 · backlog
Someone is already using it
CISA KEV catalog · public proof-of-concept · FIRST EPSS
EPSS 0.02382 · without this subject the record ranks 17
What it costs you if it fires
NVD CVSS base score, then the CNA's own
CVSS 6.8, from NVD · without this subject the record ranks 1
It is getting worse, not staying still
FIRST EPSS series, rescorings and bad loads removed
no persisting rise in 365 days · without this subject the record ranks 18
How much of the world it touches
NVD CPE configurations
0 products in the CPE ranges · without this subject the record ranks 18
Someone else already set the date
CISA KEV remediation due date
no CISA due date · without this subject the record ranks 18
$119,000 = $4.99M incident cost x 1 exposure x 0.02382 likelihood
udv@v1 · unaudited · wrong for you until you say what you run
$4.99M is the cost of a breach that happened, from IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2026, global average. It is not the value of any asset of yours. That average already covers breaches of every severity, so scaling it by exposure understates a partial-impact record. That is an assumption, not a measurement. Your own asset value goes in the decision record.
Hindsight · the state
Foresight · where to check next
No weakness class or product neighbourhood is held for this record, so this index cannot name anywhere to check next. That is an absence in the record, not a finding about the software.
Sources disagree here.
Both shown, dated. We don't pick winners. disagreement-rules@v1
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Harm, if it fires from the vector and the weakness
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CISA KEV & Federal Remediation Deadline from the record and CISA
The fix, and how long it's been waiting.
Exploit Status & Known PoCs a ladder, not a score
Current rung: Nothing observed in held sources.
- RUNG 1Nothing observed in held sources
- RUNG 2Proof-of-concept published
- RUNG 3Exploited in the wild · CISA KEV listed
- RUNG 4Ransomware campaign use known
Affected & Fixed Versions as published
A rung lights from a row in the index, never from an assessment. "Held sources" is the true scope of the claim: this index reads the CVE record, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST's EPSS and public proof-of-concept repositories, and it does not observe attacks.
What it is stated by the CNA
<p>Depending on configuration of various package managers it is possible for an attacker to insert a malicious package into a package manager's repository which can be retrieved and used during development, build, and release processes. This insertion could lead to remote code execution. We believe this vulnerability affects multiple package managers across multiple languages, including but not limited to: Python/pip, .NET/NuGet, Java/Maven, JavaScript/npm.</p> <p><strong>Attack scenarios</strong></p> <p>An attacker could take advantage of this ecosystem-wide issue to cause harm in a variety of ways. receipt
Read the rest of the CNA's description
The original attack scenarios were discovered by Alex Birsan and are detailed in their whitepaper, <a href="https://medium.com/@alex.birsan/dependency-confusion-4a5d60fec610">Dependency Confusion: How I Hacked Into Apple, Microsoft and Dozens of Other Companies</a>.</p> <ul> <li><p>With basic knowledge of the target ecosystems, an attacker could create an empty shell for a package and insert malicious code in the install scripts, give it a high version, and publish it to the public repository. Vulnerable victim machines will download the higher version of the package between the public and private repositories and attempt to install it. Due to code incompatibility it will probably error out upon import or upon compilation, making it easier to detect; however the attacker would have gained code execution by that point.</p> </li> <li><p>An advanced attacker with some inside knowledge of the target could take a copy of a working package, insert the malicious code (in the package itself or in the install), and then publish it to a public repository. The package will likely install and import correctly, granting the attacker an initial foothold and persistence.</p> </li> </ul> <p>These two methods could affect target organizations at any of these various levels:</p> <ul> <li>Developer machines</li> <li>An entire team if the configuration to import the malicious package is uploaded to a code repository</li> <li>Continuous integration pipelines if they pull the malicious packages during the build, test, and/or deploy stages</li> <li>Customers, download servers, production services if the malicious code has not been detected</li> </ul> <p>This remote code execution vulnerability can only be addressed by reconfiguring installation tools and workflows, and not by correcting anything in the package repositories themselves. See the <strong>FAQ</strong> section of this CVE for configuration guidance.</p>
NVD's analysis a second authority
- severity
- 6.8 AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P
- also scored by
- [email protected] 8.4 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H · [email protected] 7.8 CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The CNA scored it 8.4 and NVD 6.8. Both are shown because both were published; we do not pick one.
check it yourself portal.msrc.microsoft.com receipt
Dated events
Movement the material steps
This score more than doubled inside 72 hours. Both observations are in the full history below.
Show all 65 observations
65 observations held. A highlighted step crossed a promotion threshold. A step marked with a scoring model moved because the instrument was replaced, not because the vulnerability changed. receipt
The full biography
Exploit probability more than doubled between 2025-07-09 and 2025-07-12 (0.0011 → 0.00274) and the record had been public for 5 years, 6 months when this index was last written.
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What usually comes next
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